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Abstract
The purpose of this Article is to consider the implications for the European Union’s (“EU”)
Member States of the Draft Union Constitution published in the summer of 2003. The Article begins by briefly describing the process which led to the production of the Draft Treaty and considers
the formal status it would enjoy if adopted. The Article then focuses on provisions of the Draft
Treaty which: 1. deal with its relationship with the domestic law of the Member States; 2. affect
EU decision-making, particularly the functioning of institutions in which the Member States are
directly represented at the political level or the overall institutional balance in the EU; 3. affect
Member States’ freedom of action, especially in areas which might be regarded as touching core
aspects of national sovereignty; or 4. affect the functioning of national institutions or their role in
the activities of the EU. The Article concludes with an attempt to appraise the overall significance
of the Draft Treaty on the relationship between the Union and its Member States. The assessment
offered throughout the Article is of necessity, provisional. The Draft Treaty is a long and complex
document and its full implications are unlikely to be immediately apparent.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to consider the implications
for the European Union's ("EU") Member States of the Draft
Union Constitution published in the summer of 2003. The Article begins by briefly describing the process which led to the production of the Draft Treaty and considers the formal status it
would enjoy if adopted. The Article then focuses on provisions
of the Draft Treaty which:
1. deal with its relationship with the domestic law of the
Member States;
2. affect EU decision-making, particularly the functioning of
institutions in which the Member States are directly represented at the political level or the overall institutional
balance in the EU;
3. affect Member States' freedom of action, especially in areas which might be regarded as touching core aspects of
national sovereignty; or
4. affect the functioning of national institutions or their
role in the activities of the EU.
The Article concludes with an attempt to appraise the overall significance of the Draft Treaty on the relationship between
the Union and its Member States. The assessment offered
throughout the Article is of necessity, provisional. The Draft
Treaty is a long and complex document and its full implications
are unlikely to be immediately apparent.
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I. PROCESS AND STATUS
In a declaration on the future of the Union adopted in
Nice, the Member States recognized "the need to improve and
to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the
Union and its institutions, to bring them closer to the citizens of
the Member States." 1 To that end, they called for "a deeper and
wider debate ' 2 on four questions in particular:
- how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of
competencies between the European Union and the Member
States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity;
- the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice;
- a simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them
clearer and better understood without changing their meaning;
- the 3 role of national parliaments in the European architecture.
It was agreed that a new intergovernmental conference ("IGC")
would be convened to make the necessary changes to the Treaties.4
At the Laeken Summit in December 2001, the Member
States took the process forward by issuing a further declaration
fleshing out the questions identified in Nice. In relation to the
issue of simplifying the Treaties, the Laeken Declaration stated:
"[t] he question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification
and reorganization might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic
1.

DECLARATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE UNION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL

Acr

OF THE CONFERENCE, TREATY OF NICE
6, available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/
informationsen.htm#txt (last visited Dec. 30, 2003) [hereinafter DECLARATION ON THE
FUTURE OF THE UNION].

2. Id. at
3.
3. Id. at
5.
4. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 48, O.J. C 325/
5, at 31 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 67, at 78 (ex Article N) (hereinafter Consolidated TEU],
incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26,
2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty). Article 48 provides for the procedure for
amending the Treaties on which the Union is based. Id.
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features of such a constitution be?"5 The innovative step was
taken of establishing a Convention on the Future of Europe with
the task of paving the way for the IGC by considering the key
issues raised by the future development of the Union. Modelled
on the body which drew up the Union's Charter of Fundamental
Rights,6 the Convention was to be chaired by Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, a former French President. It would also comprise of
one representative of each Head of State or Government, two
members of each national parliament, sixteen members of the
European Parliament, and two representatives of the Commission. In addition, the candidate countries7 would be represented. The Convention's final document would provide the basis for discussion at the IGC, where the final decisions would be
made.
The Convention on the Future of Europe began its work in
February 2002.8 A series of working groups was established to
examine, in detail, certain important themes. In May 2003, the
Convention Praesidium, or steering group, comprised of the
Convention's Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen plus a small
team of Convention members, published 9 a Draft Union Constitution divided into four parts.1" A broad consensus on the first
5. THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - LAEKEN DECLARATION, at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm (Dec. 15, 2001) [hereinafter LAEKEN DECLARATION].
6. For the text of the Charter, see Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union,
O.J. C 364/1 (2000).
7. The candidate countries include: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia (now the Slovak Republic), Slovenia, and Turkey. All except Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey are due to accede
to the Union on May 1, 2004 pursuant to The Treaty of Accession 2003 signed in Athens on April 16, 2003. See Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003, Apr. 16,
2003, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/ treatyof-accession_2003/index.htm [hereinafter Accession Treaty].
8. A great deal of information about the Convention is available on its website. See
http://european-convention.eu.int.
9. See The European Convention, Draft Preamble to the Treaty establishing the
Constitution, CONV 722/03, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/
cvOO/cv00722en03.pdf (May 28, 2003); The European Convention, Draft Constitution,
Volume I - Revised Text of Part One, CONV 724/03, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvOO/cv00724en03.pdf (May 26, 2003) [hereinafter
Revised Text of Part One]; The European Convention, Draft Text of Part IV, with Comments, CONV 728/03, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvO0/
cv00728en03.pdf (May 26, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Text of Part IV].
10. The number of each Article is prefaced by a roman numeral denoting the Part
in which it is located. Parts I to III are sub-divided into Titles, some of which are further
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two Parts (and a number of protocols) was achieved at a plenary
session of the Convention on June 13, 2003. The agreed text was
submitted to the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki on
June 20, 2003, where it was welcomed as "a good basis for starting in the Intergovernmental Conference."1 1 The European
Council gave the Convention more time to complete "some
purely technical work" on the remainder, which was adopted by
consensus on July 10, 2003. The final text of the complete Draft
Treaty was submitted to the President of the European Council
on July 18, 2003.12
The scope of the Convention's final document is enormous. 13 It merges and reorganizes the Treaty establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty") and the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") (though not the Treaty establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty")), dispensing with the opaque three-pillar structure 4 and abolishing
the European Community as a separate entity. Among other
things, it seeks to enhance the democratic character of the
Union by expanding further the role of the European Parliament and involving the national parliaments of the Member
States more closely in the Union's affairs. It aims to simplify the
Union's legislative instruments and clarify the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. It seeks to
improve the functioning of the Union's institutions. The Draft
Treaty is now under consideration by the fifteen Member States
and the ten candidate countries due to accede in May 200415 at
an IGC, which opened on October 4, 2003. The product of the
negotiations is intended to be signed by all twenty-five Member
sub-divided into Chapters. These are occasionally broken down into Sections and even
Subsections.

11. Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions (June 19-20, 2003).
12. See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, July 18, 2003, O.J. C
169/1 (2003) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
13. For a brief overview of the Draft Treaty and the process by which it was drawn
up, see the report from the Convention Presidency to the President of the European
Council, which accompanied the final text. See European Convention, Report from the
Presidency of the Constitution to the President of the European Council, July 18, 2003,
CONV 851/03 [hereinafter Report from the Presidency].
14. On the second and third pillars, which were grafted on to the original Community pillar at Maastricht, see EILEEN DENZA, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PILLARS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2003).
15. Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey are taking part in the Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") as observers.
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States as soon as possible after enlargement takes place, possibly
on Europe Day (May 9, 2004).
What will be the formal status of the instrument which
emerges for the IGC? The full tide of the final document issued
by the Convention is "Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe."16 Although the word "Constitution" in that title has
understandably attracted more attention, it is the word "Treaty"
which has the greater legal significance. The European Union
already has a constitution comprising the Treaties on which it is
founded.1 7 These set out the Union's aims and objectives and
how they are to be achieved, but as a constitution the Treaties
are deficient. They occupy many pages and have been amended
many times. They are the subject of a large body of case law of
the Court of Justice, some of it constitutional in character. The
result is that a lay reader, if he or she could get through them,
would find it almost impossible to understand their effect.
The Convention on the Future of Europe decided that the
best way to deal with the issues raised in the Nice and Laeken
declarations was to produce a simplified and reorganized text
called a Constitution. It is true that the Convention method has
not been used before to prepare changes to the Treaties. Nonetheless, the final text, once it has been agreed upon by the Member States, will need to be ratified by each of them in accordance
with their own constitutional requirements before it can enter
into force.'" Thus, the fact that the new Treaty, which eventually
emerges, might be called a Constitution will have no formal significance in itself. It will have the same legal status as all previous Union Treaties and its significance will depend entirely on
what it actually says.

16. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, O.J. C 169/1 (2003).
17. See Parti 6cologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, [1986]
E.C.R. 1339, 23; Draft Agreement Relating to the creation of the European Economic
Area, Opinion 1/91, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079,
21 (stating that the Court of Justice described the European Economic Community Treaty as the Community's "constitutional
charter").
18. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 48, O.J. C 325/5, at 31 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 78 (ex Article N). In some Member States, this may entail recourse to a referendum.
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DRAFT TREATY AND
THE DOMESTIC LAW OF THE MEMBER STATES
A. Primacy
Article 1-10 (1) of the Draft Treaty provides: "It] he Constitution, and law adopted by the Union's Institutions in exercising
competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of
the Member States." 9 In a White Paper on the Draft Treaty, the
British Government said that the doctrine of primacy was "consistent with the principle of international law whereby a State
may not plead its national law obligations to escape its international law obligations, and prevents countries from going back
on commitments they have made to each other. ' 20 However, Article 1-10(1) seems intended to be more far-reaching. It reflects
the case law of the Court of Justice on primacy beginning with
Costa v. ENEL, a case decided as long ago as 1964.2 The effect
of that case law is that, where there is a conflict in a national
court between a national rule and a European rule, precedence
must be accorded to the latter. The relevance of the case law on
primacy to the interpretation of Article 1-10(1) is confirmed by
Article IV-3, according to which: "[t] he case-law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities shall be maintained as a
source of interpretation of Union law. "22
There are, however, at least two problems with Article I10(1). The first problem is that the existing doctrine of primacy
can only apply where the European rule is sufficiently clear to be
suitable for application by a court, a quality known as direct effect. The Draft Treaty may be regarded as defective in not making this principle clear. 23 More importantly, the existing doctrine of primacy does not extend to Titles V and VI of the TEU,
the so-called second and third pillars, which deal respectively
with the Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP") and
with Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. Because the Draft Treaty would abolish the Union's pillar struc19. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-10(1), O.J. C 169/1 at 10 (2003).
20. See BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, A
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR THE EU: THE BRITISH APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE 2003, at 12 (Cm5934, Sept. 2003) [hereinafter British
White Paper].
21. See Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
22. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV-2, O.J. C 169/1, at 57 (2003).
23. See id. art. 1-10(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (2003).
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ture, the effect of Article 1-10(1) would be to make the doctrine
of primacy applicable across the entire range of the Union's activities. However, while matters currently falling under Title VI
of the TEU would for the most part be brought within the scope
of the classic powers of the Court of Justice,2 4 most of the provisions on the CFSP would remain outside the jurisdiction of the
Court.2 5 In nearly all cases concerning the CFSP, it is therefore
unclear whether a national court would be able to ask the Court
of Justice for guidance on the effect of Article 1-10(1). If national courts are left to their own devices, there will inevitably be
divergence between Member States. The solution to this problem is either: (a) to delete the provision excluding the CFSP
from the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) to exclude the CFSP
from Article 1-10(1). In a Union which will include the rule of
law among the values on which it is based,2 6 the former would
seem preferable. Regrettably, the latter is likely to prove more
politically acceptable.
B. The European Framework Law
Many of the Community's existing powers to act involve the
use of the directive. According to Article 249 of the EC Treaty:
"[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved,
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
27
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods."
The Draft Treaty recasts and rationalizes the catalogue of acts
available to the Union. The directive is to be replaced by the
European framework law, which, according to Article 1-32(1),
shall be "binding, as to the result to be achieved, on the . . .
Member States to which it is addressed, but leaving the national
authorities entirely
free to choose the form and means of achiev28
ing that result.
The difference in wording strongly implies that Member
States are intended to enjoy greater leeway in implementing
framework laws than they do at present in giving effect to direc24. Contra id. art. 111-283, OJ. C 169/1, at 81 (2003).
25. See id. art. 111-282, O.J. C 169/1, at 81 (2003).
26. See id. art 1-2, O.J. C 169/1, at 8 (2003).
27. See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
art. 249, OJ. C 325/33, at 132 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, at 128 (ex Article 189) [hereinafter
Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Nice, supra note 4.
28. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-32, OJ. C 169/1, at 16 (2003).
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tives. That in turn suggests that framework laws may have to be
less prescriptive than many directives now are. A possible result
could be that provisions in framework laws that are sufficiently
precise to produce direct effect will no longer be permitted. If
they are, however, it may follow from Article 1-10(1) that such
provisions might be invoked in the national courts in proceedings both against the State and its organs, sometimes called vertical direct effect, and against private parties, sometimes called
horizontal direct effect. If so, that would represent a significant
departure from the present position. The Court of Justice has
held that, because Article 249 EC only makes directives binding
on the States to which they are addressed, they may not be invoked directly before the national courts in proceedings against
private parties. 2' Article 1-10(1) says that law adopted by the
Union's institutions has primacy over national law. While that
provision should probably be read as applying only to Union law
which is sufficiently precise for application by a court, it does not
in itself permit a distinction to be drawn according to the status
of the defendant. That result might be achieved by treating Article 1-32(1) as a special rule which derogates from Article 1-10(1),
but the position should be clarified, ideally by the insertion of a
provision dealing expressly with the concept of direct effect.
C. Infringement ProceedingsAgainst Member States
Ensuring that Member States implement directives properly
and within the deadline they contain has been a perennial problem for the Union." Many infringement actions brought by the
Commission before the Court ofJustice concern alleged failures
by Member States to give effect to directives. If framework laws
confer a wider margin of discretion on the Member States than
directives, the number of such actions might be expected to decline. Where the Commission does bring proceedings, the Draft
Treaty would reinforce the procedure in two ways, one of which
would be targeted specifically at the implementation of frame29. See, e.g., Faccini Dori v. Recreb, Case C-91/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3325 (1994).
30. See European Union Commission, Internal Market Scoreboard and Related
Documents, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/en/update/
score/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2003). The Commission maintains an "Internal Market
Scoreboard" showing the progress of Member States in implementing internal market
directives.
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work laws. Both of them would curtail the rights of respondent
Member States to defend themselves.
Where the Commission's complaint is that "the State concerned has failed to fulfill its obligations to notify measures
transposing a European framework law," it may, in the course of
the same proceedings, ask the Court to impose a financial penalty on the State concerned.3" At present, such a request may
only be made in the course of a fresh application to the Court
where the State concerned has not taken the steps necessary to
comply with a previous judgment. This is, in principle, a welcome reform of a cumbersome procedure. However, the reference to failure to notify the national implementing measures must
be a mistake. It would catch States who have in fact implemented but merely failed to notify where required to do so.
Clearly no penalty would be justified in such a case. If there is to
be a special rule for European framework laws, failure to transpose is surely the real mischief it should tackle.
In other cases of alleged infringement by a Member State of
its obligations, the Commission will not be able to ask the Court
to impose a financial penalty in its initial application to the
Court. As at present, the Commission will only be able to do so
if the State concerned fails to take the steps necessary to comply
with the Court's judgment. The Draft Treaty envisages that, in
such a case, the administrative procedure would be streamlined.
The Commission would have the power to bring the State directly before the Court once it had been given the opportunity
to submit its observations.3 2 The requirement, currently laid
down in Article 228(2) of the EC Treaty, that the Commission
should also issue a reasoned opinion before applying to the
Court would be inapplicable. 3 This is a rather half-hearted reform. It is unclear why the Commission should not be given a
general right to ask the Court in its initial application to impose
a financial penalty.3 4
31. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 111-267(3), OJ. C 169/1, at 79 (2003).
32. See id. art. 111-267(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 79 (2003).
33. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 228(2), O.J. C 325/33, at 125
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 125 (ex Article 171).
34. See The European Convention, Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the
Court of Justice, CONV 636/03, at
11, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/
pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00636en03.pdf (Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Final Report on Court
of Justice] (showing how this idea seems to have been supported by a majority of the
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III. MEMBER STATES'FREEDOM OF ACTION
A. Division of Powers
The existing Treaties make it hard to establish who is responsible for what: they do not make clear which powers belong
to the Union and which powers belong to the Member States. It
is for this reason that the need to establish "a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member States" was identified in Nice. 35 The question is dealt with in
Part I, Title III, of the Draft Treaty, especially Articles 1-12, 1-13,
and 1-16. The task those provisions seek to perform is a useful
one, but they may require further attention at the IGC.
Article 1-12 lists the areas in which the Union is to have exclusive competence, in other words, where the Member States
would have no power to act unless empowered to do so by the
Union. 36 The list is remarkably short, comprising only five areas,
all of which were understood by the Convention to fall within
the exclusive competence of the Union at present.3 7 The wording of Article 1-12(1) - "to establish the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market" - is, however,
problematic.3 ' The Court of Justice accepted, in a famous case
decided in 1969, that "one and the same agreement may, in
principle, be the object of two sets of parallel proceedings, one
before the Community authorities under ... the EEC Treaty, the
39
other before the national authorities under national law."
That interpretation, the Court said, was confirmed by what is
now Article 83(2) (e) of the EC Treaty, which authorizes the
Council to determine the relationship between national laws and
the Community rules on competition. Article 83(2) (e) is in substance reproduced in Article 111-52(2) (e) of the Draft Treaty.
The continued existence of domestic competition rules also unmembers of a so-called Discussion Circle on the Court ofJustice set up within the Convention).
35. See generally Armin von Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast, The European Union's Vertical
Orderof Competences: the CurrentLaw and Proposalsfor its Reform, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
227 (2002); Bruno de Witte & Grdinne de Btlrca, The Delimitationof Powers Between the EU
and its Member States, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 20122 (Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002).
36. See Revised Text of Part One, supra note 9, at 8-9.

37.
38.
39.
ing art.

Id.
See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-12(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (2003).
Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, 3 (concern85(1) EEC (now 81(1) EC), but the same logic applies to art. 82 EC).
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derlies the new Council Regulation 40 on the implementation of
the Treaty competition rules. The reference to such rules in Article 1-12 should therefore be deleted.4 '
Indeed, it is doubtful whether the subject needs to be mentioned expressly in Title III of Part I since it is an aspect of the
internal market, which Article 1-13(2) refers to as an area of
shared competence. However, the drafting of that provision is
not entirely satisfactory, as we shall see.
Article 1-16 lists five areas in which the Union may take "supporting, coordinating or complementary action. '4 2 Such action
would not supersede the competence of the Member States to
act in the areas concerned and must not entail harmonization of
national laws.
Where the Draft Treaty gives the Union a competence
which is not covered by Articles 1-12 or 1-16, it is to share that
competence with the Member States. This means that both the
Union and the Member States will be able to act. The Member
States will normally be able to do so only where the Union "has
not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competence." 43 The main areas in which shared competence applies
are listed in Article 1-13(2), though the list is not intended to be
exhaustive.4 4 Not surprisingly, the Convention had some difficulty in deciding which areas of competence should be included.4 5 In some areas, specified in Article 1-13(3) and (4), the
exercise by the Union of its competences will not prevent the
Member States from exercising their own competences.
The idea that the competence of the Member States should
be restricted once the Union has acted is not new. However, it
might be sensible to make it clear that, as in areas of exclusive
Union competence, the Member States would not be precluded
by Union action from acting themselves if permitted to do so by
Union law. A draft submitted to the Convention by a team from

40. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, OJ. L 1/1 (2003).
41. See Michael Dougan, The Convention's Draft Treaty: Bringing Europe Closer To Its
Lawyers?, 28 EUR. L. REV. 763 (2003).
42. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-16, O.J. C 169/1, at 11 (2003).
43. See id. art. 1-11(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (2003).
44. See id. art. 1-13(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 11 (2003).
45. See Revised Text of Part One, supra note 9, at art. 74-75.
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the University of Cambridge4 6 used a different formula to describe the duties of the Member States when the Union has acted in an area of shared competence, speaking of the Member
States respecting "the obligations imposed on them by the relevant Union measures."4 7 However, the precise impact on national competence of Union action will be affected by its legal
basis in Part III of the Draft Treaty.4"
Articles 1-14 and 1-15 deal respectively with the Union's competence to coordinate the economic policies of the Member
States and in matters of common foreign and security policy.
The Convention considered this to be justified by the "specific
nature" of those areas.4 9 Both are already the subject of provisions in the EC Treaty or the TEU which are developed in Part
III of the Draft Treaty.
B. The Charter of FundamentalRights and Union Accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights
The provisions of the Draft Treaty on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Union accession to the European Convention
on Human Rights ("ECHR")5 ° are undoubtedly of significance
for the Union, but their importance for the Member States is
more limited than is sometimes supposed.5 1 Article 1-7 provides
as follows:
1. The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II of the Constitution.
46. See Alan Dashwood et al., Draft Treaty of the European Union and Related Documents, 28 EUR. L. REV. 3, 17 (2003).
47. Id.
48. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-13, O.J. C 169/1, at 11 (2003); Dougan,
supra note 41.
49. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 111-2, O.J. C 169/1, at 29 (2003).
50. This is effectively excluded at present by Accession by the Community to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights] (holding that the European Community had no jurisdiction
to accede).
51. For a more detailed analysis, see HL Report of the Select Committee on the
European Union, The Future Status of the EU Charter ofFundamentalRights (HL Paper No.
48, 2003), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/
ldselect/ldeucom/48/48.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter HL Paper 48];
Anthony Arnull, From Charter to Constitution and Beyond: Fundamental Rights in the New
European Union, P.L., Winter 2003, at 774.
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2. The Union shall seek accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Constitution.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 2States, shall constitute general
5
principles of the Union's law.
Five points are worth making here:
1.

2.

3.

The Charter is addressed principally to the institutions,
bodies and agencies of the Union. It applies to the Mem-3
ber States only when they are implementing Union law.1
Its effect on the Member States is therefore more limited
than that of the general principle of respect for fundamental rights, which the Court of Justice has applied for
many years.5 4 That general principle applies to the Member States not only when they are implementing Community law55 but also when they are acting under a deroga56
tion for which Community law provides.
The Charter "does not extend the field of application of
Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish
any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers
and tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitution. ' 57
Although the Convention did not reopen the substantive
provisions of the Charter, it revised the so-called horizontal provisions, which deal with its interpretation and application. 58 Particularly worthy of note is the new Article

52. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art 1-7, OJ. C 169/1, at 9 (2003).
53. See id. art. 11-51(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
54. Roquette Frres v. Directeur gen~ral de la concurrence, de la consommation
et de la repression des frauds, Case C-94/00, [2003] 4 C.M.L.R. 1, 25. See also Steffensen, Case C-276/01, [2003] 2 C.M.L.R. 13. The right of the Court to continue to apply
the general principle would not be affected by the Draft Treaty. See Draft Treaty, supra
note 12, art. 1-7(3), O.J. C 169/1, at 9 (2003).
55. See Wachauf v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609,
19.
56. See ERT, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925,
43.
57. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 11-51(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
58. See Grainne de Bfirca, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, in TEN REFLECTIONS
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE 11, 20-25 (Bruno de Witte ed., 2003); Er-

ich Vranes, The Final Clauses of the CharterofFundamentalRights - Stumbling Blocks for the
Firstand Second Convention, 7 Eur. Integration Online Papers 6 (2003), availableat http:/
/eiop.or.at/eiop/.
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11-52(5), which provides: "The provisions of this Charter
which contain principles may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by Institutions and bodies of
the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are
implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognizable only in
the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their
legality."5 9 In other words, Charter provisions containing
principles, as opposed to rights, may only be invoked
before a court where the interpretation or validity of an
act intended to give effect to them is in issue. 6"
EU accession to the ECHR ought not in principle to affect the reservations which individual Member States
have entered in relation to particular provisions. The
need not to prejudice Member States' reservations is
sometimes cited as an obstacle to accession. However,
the House of Lords EU Committee has pointed out that:
"Since Union accession would be restricted to matters
within Union competence it is not apparent why Union
61
accession should affect Member States' reservations."
As the Committee explained: "If the EU were to consider
accession to the ECHR, the Member States would have to
agree on the reservations (if any) to be made by the
Union. The EU would also have the right under Article
15 ECHR to make specific derogations. These, too,
would have to be agreed by Member States. But any such
reservations or derogations would apply only in relation
62
to European Union law."
Notwithstanding the apparently imperative wording of
Article 1-7(2), the opening of negotiations and the con-

59. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 11-52(5), O.J. C 169/1, at 28 (2003).
60. There may of course be an argument over whether a particular provision lays
down a right or a principle. An updated version of the "explanations" of the text of the
Charter, originally prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the body which
drafted the Charter, gives Articles II-25, 11-26 (although those Articles use the language
of rights), and 11-37 as examples of principles recognized in the Charter. According to
the updated "explanations," the following provisions contain elements of both rights
and principles: Articles 11-23, 11-33, and 11-34. See European Convention, Updated
Explanations relating to the text on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, CONV 828/03,
at 51, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cvO/cvO0828enO3.pdf
(July 9, 2003). The courts of both the European Union and the Member States are to
pay "due regard to the explanations" when interpreting the Charter, although they do
not purport to be legally binding.
61. HL Paper 48, supra note 51, at 122. The Committee's report contains a table
setting out the reservations made by Member States. See id. at 1 43-44.
62. Id. at 1 123.
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clusion of an agreement for Union accession to the
ECHR would require authorization by the Council of
Ministers, acting unanimously.6 3 Accession would
also re64
quire the consent of the European Parliament.
C. Withdrawal
Article 1-59 contains a procedure for Member States to withdraw from the Union.6 5 It represents a considerable break with
tradition, no such provision having been included in the Treaties so far, and underlines the voluntary nature of membership
and the continuing sovereignty of the Member States.
IV. DECISION-MAKING AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
A. Decision-making
The Draft Treaty contains important provisions on decisionmaking. Their significance in the present context lies in their
effect on the capacity of individual Member States to influence
the outcome of deliberations, particularly in the Council of Ministers, and on the balance between the Council and the European Parliament.
Article 1-22(3) changes the default rule for decision-making
in the Council from a simple to qualified majority.6 6 In theory,
this works in favor of the larger Member States, because under
qualified majority voting ("QMV") the number of votes attributed to a Member State varies according to its population. In
practice, the existing default rule rarely applies.
Article 1-24(1) says that, when the Council of Ministers, or
the European Council, makes decisions by QMV, "such a majority shall consist of the majority of Member States, representing at
least three-fifths of the population of the Union."6 7 That would
represent a radical departure from the existing system. The
63. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, arts. 111-227(2), 111-227(9), O.J. C 169/1, at 72
(2003). The Commission has proposed that the Council should act by qualified majority. See Commission of the European Communities, Opinion on the Draft Treaty,
COM(548) (Sept. 2003), at 7 [hereinafter Commission Opinion].
64. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. III-227(7)(b), O.J. C 169/1, at 72 (2003).
65. See id. art. 1-59, O.J. C 169/1, at 22 (2003).
66. Cf Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 205(1), O.J. C 325/33, at 118
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 121 (ex Article 148).
67. Two-thirds of the Member States representing at least three-fifths of the population of the Union where the Council is not acting on the basis of a proposal from the
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beauty of the dual majority formula lies in its clarity, objectivity,
and durability. It would not need to be adjusted each time a new
Member State joined the Union. It is also consistent with the
idea of the Union as a polity of both States and peoples.6 8 However, the voting element of the formula would, for example, give
Malta the same weight as the U.K., while the population element
would mean that France, for example, had considerably less
weight than Germany, a State with which it currently enjoys parity." Moreover, because no two Member States would have precisely the same weight, the dual majority formula could complicate the process of building a qualified majority. In addition,
the populations of the Member States would need to be reviewed regularly.
A dual majority formula, although requiring only a simple
majority of the Union's population rather than three fifths, was
advocated by the Commission and by several delegations at
Nice.7" It was ultimately rejected in favor of the traditional system of weighted votes, although the process of agreeing on the
re-weightings to be applied in an enlarged Union proved acrimonious. The larger Member States were not content with a
mere extrapolation of the existing system because they felt it had
become increasingly biased with successive enlargements in
favor of small and medium-sized Member States. That had produced a progressive decline in the minimum percentage of the
Union's population represented by a qualified majority. That
decline, it was argued, needed to be halted or reversed if the
legitimacy of qualified majority votes was not to be undermined.71
No doubt mindful of the outcome at Nice, 72 the authors of
the Draft Treaty provided that the dual majority formula would
Commission or the initiative of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. See Draft Treaty,

supra note 12, art. 1-24(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 13 (2003).
68. Cf Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-1(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 8 (2003).
69. See DAVID GALLOWAY, THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND 71-72 (2001)

(the ac-

count here draws heavily on this book).
70. Not surprisingly, the Commission has welcomed the inclusion in the Draft
Treaty of such a formula, describing it as simpler and more democratic. See Commission Opinion, supra note 63, at 2.
71. See GALLOWAY, supra note 69, at 66-72; Bela Plechanovovd, The Treaty of Nice
and the Distribution of Votes in the Council - Voting Power Consequencesfor the EU after the
Oncoming Enlargement, 7 EUR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2003), available at http://

eiop.or.at/eiop/.
72. See Treaty of Nice supra note 4, Protocol A, O.J. C 80/1, at 49-52 (2001). Arti-
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not take effect until November 1, 1999, after the European Parliament elections scheduled for that year had taken place. Until
then, the vote weightings set out in Article 2 of a Protocol annexed to the Draft Treaty7 3 would apply."4 Where the Constitution requires the European Council or the Council of Ministers
to act on a proposal from the Commission, decisions will be
adopted where at least 232 votes out of 321 are cast in favor by a
majority of members.7" The Draft Treaty also embodies a population test that would enable any Member State to ask for a
check to be made to ensure that States comprising a qualified
majority represent at least 62% of the Union's total population.76 If they do not, their decision will not take effect.
The rule that a qualified majority must in most cases be cast
by a majority of the Member States does not currently feature in
the Treaty, although at least half the Member States are always
involved in a qualified majority under the present system. At
Nice, the less populous States insisted on the inclusion of such a
rule after enlargement as part of the price for their agreement to
an increase in the relative weighting of the larger States. The
new rule preserves the legitimacy of qualified majority decisions
in terms of both people and States. In other words, it prevents
qualified majority decisions from being taken by a minority of
the Member States, however populous they are. The requirement only seems likely to be of practical importance, however,
cle 3(1) of Protocol A is repealed by Article 26(2) of the Accession Treaty. See id. Protocol A, art. 3(1), O.J. C 80/1, at 50-51 (2001); Accession Treaty, supra note 7, art. 26(2).
73. Draft Treaty, supra note 12, Protocol on the Representation of Citizens in the
European Parliament and the Weighting of Votes in the European Council and the
Council of Ministers, O.J. C 169/1, at 96 (2003) [hereinafter Protocol on Representation]. Article 2 of the Protocol on Representation corresponds to the scale that will
take effect on November 1, 2004, by virtue of Article 12 of the Accession Treaty. See id.
art. 2, at 96; Accession Treaty, supra note 7, art. 12, at 36-37. Different weightings will
apply for the period until October 31, 2004. Under that transitional arrangement, the
present system will simply be extrapolated with the votes of the fifteen existing Member
States remaining unchanged. See Accession Treaty, supra note 7, art. 26.
74. Article 2 of the Protocol on Representation assumes a Union of twenty-five
Member States. See Protocol on Representation, supra note 73, art. 2, at 96. A declaration attached to it deals with the consequences of Romanian and Bulgarian accession.
See id.
75. In other cases, decisions will be adopted if at least 232 votes are cast in favor by
at least two-thirds of the members. See id. art. 2(1), at 96.
76. Such a test is featured in the Treaty of Nice and also appears in the Accession
Treaty. See Treaty of Nice, supra note 4, Protocol A, art. 3(1), OJ. C 80/1, at 50-1
(2001); Accession Treaty, supra note 7, art. 12(1).
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where all the most populous States vote in favor of a measure
and the entire least populous vote against it. In reality, this is
unlikely to occur.7 7

The main effect of the population clause is to enhance the
capacity of Germany to block QMV decisions to which it is opposed. The clause emerged at Nice as a compromise between
Germany's wish to see its greater relative size reflected in the
vote weightings and France's unwillingness to accept that it
should have fewer votes than Germany, even though Germany's
population is greater by more than 23 million. It also helped to
satisfy larger Member States who were not content with the extent to which their relative voting weights had been increased. 8
At present, qualified majorities typically represent well over 62%
of the Union's total population, but the clause will come into
play whenever Germany is in a minority. Paradoxically, if Germany had been given more votes, this would have assisted the
process of building a qualified majority. Concealing Germany's
extra weight in the population clause means that it only becomes
relevant in constructing blocking minorities.7 9
A good deal of number-crunching will be needed to establish how the systems envisaged by the Draft Treaty compare with
the present system.8 0 Table 1 offers a simple comparison between the present position and the systems that are intended to
apply until the dual majority formula takes effect.8 1

77. GALLOWAY, supra note 69, at 90-91.
78. Plechanovovd, supra note 71, at 14.
79. GALLOWAY, supra note 69, at 91.

80. Although enlargement may well alter the dynamics of decision-making.
81. Tables 1 and 2 are based on data contained in Plechanovovd, supra note 71,
and GALLOWAY, supra note 69, at 66, ch. 4.
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Table 1
Total

Qualified majority

Blocking minority

number

Votes

Minimum

Votes

Minimum

of

required

number of

required

number of

States

(percentage
of total)

States

votes
Now (EU-15)

87

62

8

26

3

(29.89%)
Accession to
Oct. 31, 2004
(EU-25)

124

88

13

37
(29.84%)

4

Nov. 1, 2004
(EU-25)

321

232

13
(subject to

90
(28.04%)

4

population
criterion)

Table 2 shows the evolution of the QMV threshold with successive enlargements expressed as a percentage of the votes required.
Table 2
EU-6

EU-9

EU-JO

EU-12

EU-15

EU-25
(to Oct.
31,
2004)

EU-25
(from
Nov 1,
2004)

70.59%

70.69%

71.43%

71.05%

71.26%

70.97%

72.27%

After November 1, 2004, a qualified majority will become
more difficult than ever to achieve. Nor does it seem likely that
the introduction of the dual majority system from November 1,
2009 onwards would have a significant effect on the ease with
which a qualified majority could be built.8 2 A majority of the
Member States would still be required and the population
threshold - albeit lowered marginally -

would be elevated from

82. The main effect of the dual majority system would appear to be on the relative
weight of individual Member States.
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a facility available to States in the minority to part of the very
definition of a qualified majority. It is against that background
that the further extension in the use of qualified majority voting
contemplated by the Draft Treaty needs to be viewed.
One important reason for that extension is the elevation of
the so-called co-decision procedure, currently described in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, into the Union's "ordinary legislative
procedure." 3 This means that the Union's legislative acts, European laws84 and European framework laws, will normally be
adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers. 5 The ordinary legislative procedure is set out in Article 111-302. The text has been simplified, but the substance remains essentially unchanged from Article 251 of the EC Treaty.
The Council will act by qualified majority throughout except in
one situation. Where the procedure starts with a Commission
proposal, the Council must act unanimously if it wishes to approve amendments proposed by the European Parliament at second reading on which the Commission has delivered a negative
opinion. 6
Although, like the co-decision procedure, the ordinary legislative procedure will normally be launched by the submission of
a proposal by the Commission, Article 1-33(1) envisages the
adoption of legislative acts at the initiative of a group of Member
States. The circumstances in which this will be permitted are set
out in Article 111-165, which refers to Section 4 ('judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters") and Section 5 ("Police Cooperation") of Chapter IV ("Area of Freedom, Security and Justice")
of Part III. This incursion into the Commission's right of initiative is intended to balance the use of the ordinary legislative procedure in that field. 7 A corresponding provision has been inserted into Article 111-302 to take account of cases where the ordinary legislative procedure is not triggered by a Commission
83. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 251, OJ. C 325/33, at 133-34
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 129 (ex Article 189b).
84. Corresponding essentially to regulations under the current system.
85. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-33, OJ. C 169/1, at 16 (2003).
86. See id. art. 111-302(9), OJ. C 169/1, at 84 (2003).
87. See The European Convention, Draft Sections of Part Three with Comments,
May 27, 2003, CONV 727/03, at 29; cf Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 27, art.
67(1), OJ. C 325/33, at 60 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 91 (ex Article 730) (with the temporary
incursion expiring on May 1, 2004).
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proposal. s8
B. The Presidency of the European Council and the Union Minister
for Foreign Affairs
A provision is made in the Draft Treaty for the European
Council to elect its President by a qualified majority for a term of
two and a half years, renewable once.8 9 The function of the
President, who would not be permitted to hold a national mandate, would be to facilitate the work of the European Council
and to "ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy."9 ° Article 1-24(5) makes it clear that neither the President nor the President of the Commission would vote where the European Council acts by qualified majority. The reason seems to be that no
votes are attributed to them under the QMV formula. What is
perhaps less clear is whether the same rule is intended to apply
where the European Council acts by unanimity.9 1 If it is, the result would be that either President could block a decision taken
by consensus, that is, without recourse to a vote, under the default rule laid down in Article 1-20(4),92 but not one taken by
unanimity, which implies the taking of a vote. 9 3 The extreme
subtlety of that distinction suggests that Article 1-24 (5) should be
regarded as confined to QMV, which would mean that the President of the European Council, as well as the President of the
Commission, would have a vote when the Constitution requires
the European Council to act unanimously. This might usefully
be clarified.
88. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 111-302(15), O.J. C 169/1, at 84 (2003).
89. The Draft Treaty also provides for the Member States that have adopted the
Euro to elect a president for two and a half years. See Draft Treaty, Protocol on the
Euro Group, July 18, 2003, art. 2, O.J. C 169/1, at 97 (2003). The Commission has
suggested that the duration of the presidency of the Euro Group should coincide with
that of the presidency of the Economic and Financial Affairs (or Ecofin) Council. See
Commission Opinion, supra note 63, at 10 n.7.
90. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-21, OJ.C 169/1, at 12 (2003).
91. See id. art. 1-24(5), O.J. C 169/1, at 13 (2003). This Article is a free-standing
paragraph in a provision headed "Qualified majority".
92. See id. art. 1-20(4) (providing: "Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, decisions of the European Council shall be taken by consensus").
93. See JAN WERTS, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL 130-32 (1992). The terms "consensus"
and "unanimity" would both permit decisions to be blocked by a single Member State.
See also Alan A. Dashwood, Decision-making at the Summit, 3 CYELS 79 (2000); DENZA,
supra note 14, at 138.
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The provisions concerning the President of the European
Council, together with new arrangements for determining the
Presidency of the Council of Ministers,9 4 are designed to avoid
the disruption caused by the present system, under which the
presidency of the Council of Ministers rotates every six months
and the European Council meets under the chairmanship of the
Member State holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers. In a Union of twenty-five Member States, the present system would mean that each State held the presidency only once
every twelve and one-half years. The creation of the post of President of the European Council has encountered opposition
from the Commission, which has warned against creeping extension of his or her responsibilities and emphasized the limited
democratic legitimacy the President would enjoy. The Commission has also underlined the need for the status of the President9 5 to be spelled out in the Constitution more clearly.9 6
The Draft Treaty would, in addition, endow the Union with
a Minister for Foreign Affairs with the responsibility of conducting the CFSP. Appointed by qualified majority vote of the
European Council with the agreement of the President of the
Commission, 7 the person chosen would be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He or she would also chair the Foreign Affairs Council (one of the formations of the Council of
Ministers) 9 8 and "take part" in the work (without being a member) of the European Council.9 9 The Minister would be assisted
by a European External Action Service working in cooperation
with the diplomatic services of the Member States. The Minister
94. The Draft Treaty envisages that the Presidency of most Council of Ministers
formations (all except that of Foreign Affairs) will be held by different Member States
for periods of at least a year. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-23(4), OJ. C 169/1,
at 10 (2003). The Foreign Affairs Council would be chaired by the Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
95. E.g., Nationality, duty of independence, ban on engaging in another occupation, replacement in the event of death or resignation. Cf Draft Treaty, supra note 12,
arts. 111-250 - 111-253, O.J. C 169/1, at 76-77 (2003) (concerning members of the Commission).
96. See Commission Opinion, supra note 63, at 10. See also European Parliament
Resolution on the Draft Treaty and the IGC, 11047/2003 - C5-0340/2003 - 2003/
0902(CNS),
20, Sept. 24, 2003 [hereinafter European Parliament's Resolution of
Sept. 24, 2003].
97. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-27(1), OJ. C 169/1, at 14 (2003).
98. Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-23(3), OJ. C 169/1, at 13 (2003).
99. See id. art. 1-20(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 12 (2003).
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would represent the Union in matters relating to the CFSP,
"conduct political dialogue on the Union's behalf and . . . express the Union's position in international organisations and at
international conferences."'10 He or she would have the right to
"refer to the Council of Ministers any question relating to the
common
foreign and security policy," and to submit proposals to
1
10

it.

These arrangements are designed to alleviate some of the
problems caused by the present division of functions between
the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, who also exercises the function of High Representative for the CFSP, and the
Commissioner for External Relations. In its White Paper on the
Draft Treaty, the British Government said that a merger of those
two posts
would make the European Union more effective in areas
where we have a common foreign policy, such as in the
Balkans and the Middle East Peace Process. On such issues,
our own influence is enhanced by having a common Eurowill both
pean approach, and a single EU spokesman
02
strengthen and streamline this European role.'

The establishment of a Foreign Minister has also been welcomed
by the Commission. 3 Whether the Minister's bicephalous nature will prove workable may be questionable, however, and the
precise nature of his or her relationship with the President of
the European Council and the Member States is not easy to discern.10 4 There are also concerns about the accountability of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose democratic legitimacy would
only be indirect. 0 5
100. See id. art. 111-197(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 66 (2003).
101. See id. art. 111-200(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 67 (2003). The right of the Council of
Ministers to act by qualified majority vote when acting on the basis of a proposal put to
it by the Minister is discussed below.
102. See British White Paper, supra note 20, at 87.
103. See Commission Opinion, supra note 63, at 3, 11.
104. The British Government says in its White Paper: "We will of course want to
ensure that this representative is properly accountable to Member States in the Coun87.
cil." British White Paper, supra note 20, at
105. The nomination of the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be subject to a vote
of approval by the European Parliament along with the rest of the Commission. See
Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-26(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 14 (2003). The Minister could
in the last resort be dismissed by the European Council, acting by qualified majority
with the consent of the President of the Commission. Id. art. 1-27(1), O.J. C 169/1, at
14 (2003). See also HL Report of the Select Committee on the European Union, The
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C. ExternalAction and the Solidarity Clause
Article 1-6 provides: "The Union shall have legal personality."106 That provision complements the abolition of the pillar
structure and contributes to the simplification of the Treaties. It
probably does not change the existing position: Article 281 of
the EC Treaty expressly confers legal personality on the European Community and it is strongly arguable that the Union already possesses implied legal personality as a matter of public
international law. 10 7 Moreover, the question of legal personality
is separate from both the question of competences and that of
the procedure for entering into international agreements. This
was made clear in the final report of Working Group III, where it
is noted:
Explicit conferral of a single legal personality on the Union
does not per se entail any amendment, either to the current
allocation of competences between the Union and the Member States or to the allocation of competences between the
current Union and Community. Nor does it involve any
amendments to the respective procedures and powers of the
institutions regarding in particular the opening, negotiation
and conclusion of international agreements. l 8
The external competence of the Union is dealt with in Articles 111-225 and 111-226. In addition, Article 1-12(2) provides:
"[t]he Union shall have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, is necessary to enable
the Union to exercise its competence internally, or affects an
internal Union act." That provision seems intended to give effect to the case law of the Court of Justice,1 °9 but there is conFuture of Europe: Constitutional Treaty - Draft Articles on External Action, at 1 6-7 (HL
Paper No. 107, 2003) [hereinafter Draft Articles on External Action].
106. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-6, O.J. C 169/1, at 9 (2003).
107. This was acknowledged by the British Government in its White Paper. See British White Paper, supra note 20, at 47. See also Alan Dashwood, Issues of decision-making
in the European Union after Nice, in ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 17-21 (Anthony Arnull & Daniel Wincott eds., 2002).
108. The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, Oct. 1, 2002, CONV 305/02, at 6.
109. See THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS (Alan Dashwood & Christophe Hillion eds., 2000); T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW ch. 6 (5th ed. 2003).
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cern that it does not do so accurately 1 ° and it may need to be
revisited at the IGC. Following a recommendation by Working
Group III, the Draft Treaty contains a general provision dealing
with the procedure for negotiating and concluding international
agreements." 1
The provisions of the Draft Treaty on external action with
the greatest significance for the Member States are perhaps
those dealing with the CFSP. The provisions in question fall into
three main groups. In ascending order of detail, they are: (a)
Article 1-15; (b) Articles 1-39 to 1-40; (c) Chapter II of Title V of
Part III (Articles 111-195 to 111-215). Article 111-282 excludes most
of those provisions from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
The only exceptions are Articles 1-15 and III-209.112
Article 1-15 provides as follows:
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign
and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and
all questions relating to the Union's security, including the
progressive framing of a common defence policy, which
might lead to a common defence.
2. Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the
Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts
adopted by the Union in this area. They shall refrain from
action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its
effectiveness. 1 '

The power of the Court of Justice to review compliance by
Member States with the second subparagraph of that provision is
particularly significant. It might lead the Court to be called
110. See Dougan, supra note 41.
111. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 111-227, 0J.C 169/1, at 72 (2003). There
is a special provision for the conclusion of agreements concerning exchange rates for
the euro in relation to currencies other than those that are legal tender within the
Union. Id. art. 111-228, 0J.C 169/1, at 73 (2003).
112. The Court would also have jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons adopted pursuant to the Common Foreign
and Security Policy ("CFSP") under Article 111-224(2). See Draft Treaty, supra note 12,
art. 111-282(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 81 (2003). The wording of that paragraph suggests that
the Court would not have jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive measures interrupting or reducing economic and financial relations with third countries adopted pursuant to the CFSP under Article 111-224(1). That would involve removing from the
Court a power it currently enjoys and is undesirable as a matter of principle. For further discussion, see Final Report on Court of Justice, supra note 34.
113. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-15, 0.J. C 169/1, at 11 (2003).
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upon to consider whether action by a Member State complies
with an act adopted by the Union in this area or is contrary to
the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness. At least
some of those issues could well be considered justiciable, though
the Court might find its position slightly uncomfortable. If it
were to take too broad a view of its jurisdiction to apply Article I15, the effect might be to undermine Article 111-282 so far as the
obligations of Member States are concerned. If, on the other
hand, it were to take a narrow view, the effect might be to undermine the apparently deliberate exclusion of Article 1-15 from Article 111-282.
Article 111-209, first subparagraph, provides:
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the competences listed in Articles 1-12 to I14 [exclusive competence, shared competence, coordination

of economic and employment policies] and 1-16 [supporting,
coordinating or complementary action]. Likewise, the imple-

mentation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the competence referred to in Article 1-15.114

That provision is a refinement of Article 47 TEU, according to
which the TEU shall not affect the Community Treaties. The
Court of Justice has jurisdiction to apply Article 47 of the TEU
and it did so in the "Airport Transit Visas" case. The Court
stated it was responsible for ensuring that "acts which, according
to the Council, fall within the scope of the .

.

. Treaty on Euro-

pean Union, do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the
EC Treaty on the Community." ' 5 Article 111-209 would prevent
the provisions on the CFSP from being used to interfere with
other competences enjoyed by the Union under the Draft Treaty
and vice versa. Its purpose is to stop a power or a process applicable in one field from being used to take steps which ought
properly to be regarded as falling within a different field. It is an
application of the principle of conferral, according to which "the
Union shall act within the limits of the competences conferred
upon it by the Member States in the Constitution to attain the
objectives set out in the Constitution."'1 6 The fundamental na114. See id. art. 111-209, OJ. C 169/1, at 68 (2003).
115. Commission v. Council, Case C-170/96, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2763,
16 (Airport
Transit Visas).
116. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-9(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (2003).
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ture of that principle explains the grant to the Court ofjurisdiction to apply Article 111-209.
Article 1-39 provides that the CFSP shall be "based on the
development of mutual political solidarity among Member
States, the identification of questions of general interest and the
achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of
Member States' actions." ' 7 The necessary European decisions""8 are to be adopted by the European Council and the
Council of Ministers, acting unanimously, except in the cases referred to in Part III. The European Council and the Council of
Ministers will act on a proposal from a Member State or from the
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting alone or with the
Commission's support. Recourse to European laws and European framework laws is specifically ruled out in this context.
The European Council may unanimously decide that the Council of Ministers should act by qualified majority in cases other
than those referred to in Part III.
Article 1-40 states that the Common Security and Defense
Policy ("CSDP") shall be an integral part of the CFSP." 19 The
CSDP is to include the progressive framing of a common Union
defense policy. In language stronger than that of Article 1-15(1),
the first subparagraph of Article 1-40(2) says that this "will lead to
a common defense," (emphasis added), but only when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. Moreover, the
decision of the European Council will have to be recommended
to the Member States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
That particularly heavy variant of the decision-making process, involving what amounts to national ratification of a Union
act, 120 represents an acknowledgment of the momentous character such a decision would have. The House of Lords EU Committee noted of a previous version of Article 1-40(2) that a decision of this type
would not only have profound implications for the role of
NATO, but also appears to be wholly unrealistic in the fore117. See id. art. 1-39(1), O.J. C 169/1, at 17 (2003).
118. A European decision is "a non-legislative act, binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them."
Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-32(1), 0.J. C 169/1, at 16 (2003).
119. See id. art. 1-40, O.J. C 169/1, at 18 (2003).
120. See ANTHONY ARNULL ET AL., EUROPEAN UNoN LAw 49 (4th ed. 2000).
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seeable future. The Committee can see a case for such an
aspirational provision against the possibility that NATO might
become ineffective and that the Member States might accordingly need an alternative mechanism. We assert our view that
we would not wish any developments in European Union defence to weaken the role of NATO. We also believe that it is
wholly unlikely that "the progressive framing of a common
21
defense policy ... will lead to a common defense."'
The Draft Treaty would continue to make it clear that the CSDP
"must not prejudice the specific character of the security and
defense policy" of non-aligned Member States and Member
States who see their collective defense as assured principally
through NATO and must "be compatible with the common se122
curity and defense policy established within that framework.'
In its White Paper, the British Government said it thought that
effective links to NATO were essential: "[wie will not agree to
anything which is contradictory to, or would replace, the security
123
guarantee established through NATO."
Detailed rules on decision-making under the CFSP are set
out in Article 111-201. Article 111-201 (1) is essentially the same as
Article 23(1) of the TEU. The first subparagraph provides that
the Council of Ministers is to act unanimously and that abstentions will not prevent it from doing SO. 1 2 4 The second subparagraph includes a mechanism for so-called constructive abstention. Under that mechanism, a Member State that qualifies an
abstention is not obliged to apply the decision, but must accept
that it commits the Union and refrain from any action likely to
undermine it. 125 If the number of Council members qualifying
their abstentions in this way exceeds a certain threshold, the decision cannot be adopted. The second subparagraph of Article
111-201 (1) alters the current threshold to "one third of the Member States representing at least one third of the population of
the Union".

1 26

Article 111-201 (2) sets out the cases in which, by derogation
121. Draft Articles on External Action, supra note 105, at 12.
122. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 140, OJ. C 169/1, at 18 (2003). See also id.
art 1-40(2), para. 2, OJ. C 169/1, at 18 (reproducing the second subparagraph of Article 17(1) of the Consolidated TEU).
123. See British White Paper, supra note 20, at 95.
124. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 111-201, OJ. C 169/1, at 67 (2003).
125. See id. art. 111-201(2), OJ. C 169/1, at 67 (2003).
126. The current threshold is set at Member States representing more than one-
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from Article 111-201 (1), the Council of Ministers may act by qualified majority. Three of the cases mentioned correspond essentially to those in which the Council of Ministers is currently permitted to act by a qualified majority within the framework of the
CFSP by Article 23(2) of the TEU. A new fourth case would allow the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority "when
adopting a decision on a Union action or position, on a proposal
which the Minister [for Foreign Affairs] has put to it following a
specific request to him or her from the European Council made
on its own initiative or that of the Minister."127
This represents a potentially significant extension in the use
of qualified majority voting in relation to the CFSP. However,
in an important change from earlier drafts, QMV is now only
envisaged where the Minister has made his or her proposal at
the request of the European Council, which would act by consensus. 128 Moreover, as with Article 23(2) of the TEU, an "emergency brake" is available to any member of the Council which is
opposed to the adoption of a decision by qualified majority vote.
Thus, Article 111-201 (2) provides:
If a member of the Council of Ministers declares that, for vital
and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the
adoption of a European decision to be adopted by qualified
majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs will, in close consultation with the Member
State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he or
she does not succeed, the Council of Ministers may, acting by
a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to
129
the European Council for decision by unanimity.
It is arguable that the Draft Treaty would make the "emergency
brake" slightly more difficult to apply in this context, for the
word "vital" in the opening sentence (italicized above) has replaced the word "important" in Article 23(2) of the Treaty on
European Union. That change may not have any practical significance.
third of the votes as weighted under QMV. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art.
23(1), O.J. C 325/5, at 18 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 72 (ex Article J.13).
127. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. III-201(2)(b), O.J. C 169/1, at 67 (2003).
128. The Draft Treaty does not specify how the European Council is to act in this
instance, so the default rule in Article 1-20(4) would apply. See Draft Treaty, supra note
12, art. 1-20(4), O.J. C 169/1, at 12 (2003).
129. Id. art. 111-201(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 67 (2003) (emphasis added).
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Article 111-201 (4) preserves the current exclusion130 of qualified majority voting in the case of "decisions having military or
defense implications." 131 Such decisions are also excluded from
the European Council's power, reiterated in Article 111-201(3),
to decide unanimously that the Council of Ministers should act
by qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in Article 111-201 (2). Partial compensation for those exclusions may
be found in provisions on new forms of enhanced cooperation
in the context of the CSDP. 13 2 Enhanced cooperation, in relation to matters having military or defense implications, is currently ruled out by the second sentence of Article 27b of the
TEU. There was, however, a feeling in the Convention that enhanced cooperation might be useful in security and defense matters because of differences between the Member States regarding their capabilities and willingness to commit them. 1 1 3 Enhanced cooperation under the CFSP in matters that do not have
military or defense implications, currently the subject of provisions introduced at Nice,' 3 4 is dealt with in Articles 111-325 and
111-326.
In the Working Group on defense, there was broad support
for a new provision spelling out the principle of solidarity between Member States. The provision was not envisaged as "a
clause on collective defence entailing an obligation to provide
military assistance," but as applying to threats from non-State entities.1 35 The provision contemplated appears in the Draft
Treaty as Article 142, which is headed "Solidarity clause." It provides:
1. The Union and its Member States shall actjointly in a spirit
of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack
or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise
all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
130. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 23(2), O.J. C 325/5, at 18 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 72 (ex Article J.13).
131. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 111-201(4) (2003).
132. See id. arts. 1-40(6)-(7), 111-211, 111-213, 111-214, O.J. C 169/1, at 18, 69 (2003).
133. See The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VIII on Defense, CONV 461/02, at 19, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/
cvOO/00461en2.pdf (Dec. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Final Report of Working Group VIII].
134. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 27, O.J. C 325/5, at 19 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 73 (ex ArticleJ.17).
135. See Final Report of Working Group VIII, supra note 133, at 20.
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- prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its
political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack;
(b) - assist a Member State in its territory at the request of
its political authorities in the event of a disaster.
2. The detailed arrangements for implementing this provision are at Article III-231.136
Article 111-231 (1) gives the Council of Ministers the task, acting
on a joint proposal by the Commission and the Union Minister
for Foreign Affairs, of adopting a European decision laying
down the arrangements for implementing the solidarity clause.
The European Parliament merely has to be "informed." The
Council of Ministers would act by qualified majority under the
default rule contained in Article 1-22(3) .13' By virtue of Article
111-231 (2), "[s]hould a Member State fall victim to a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States
13
shall assist it at the request of its political authorities.""
The House of Lords EU Committee said of an earlier version of the solidarity clause that it was "a fundamental and constitutional provision," which represented "an extension of existing provisions. While the aspirations of this Clause may be valuable for political reasons, the defense implications should not
be overlooked." 13' The clause has been welcomed by the British
Government, which said in its White Paper 4 ° that it "should give
us a robust mechanism to ensure a swift, coordinated response
to a Member State's request for help in dealing with the consequences of a disaster or terrorist attack."
Finally, it should be noted that the Council of Ministers, acting by a qualified majority, will be required to adopt a European
decision defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the
European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities
(a)

136. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-42, O.J. C 169/1, at 19(2003).
137. Technically, the solidarity clause would fall outside the scope of the CFSP, so
Articles 1-39(7) and 111-201(1) would not apply.
138. The European Convention, Draft Constitution, Volume II - Draft Texts of
Parts Two, Three and Four, CONV 725/03, at art. 111-226(2) (ex Article X), available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00725.en03.pdf (May 27, 2003).
139. Draft Articles on External Action, supra note 105, at 14.
140. British White Paper, supra note 20, at 94.
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Agency referred to in the second subparagraph of Article I40(3).14' The Agency is to be "open to all Member States wishing to be part of it."142 The creation of the Agency is supported
by the British Government, which said in its White Paper that it
"should ensure that improved, more cost-effective, capabilities
are made available to ESDP (European Security and Defence
Policy) as a result of increased transparency and cooperation
among Member States. This is essential to the EU being able to
run crisis management operations in an appropriate, timely and
effective way. 143
D. Composition of the Commission
With effect from November 1, 2009, the Commission would
comprise of its President, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and thirteen European Commissioners along with ten non-voting Commissioners.' 4 4 The introduction of non-voting Commissioners would be an innovation. The two categories of Commissioner are to be selected on the basis of a system of equal rotation between the Member States. Although there are currently
two Commissioners from the larger Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K.), the relevant provisions of the
Draft Treaty represent a partial retreat from the position agreed
on at Nice, where it was accepted that the Commission would in
due course comprise fewer Commissioners than Member
States.' 4 5 Under the Draft Treaty, each Member State would be
guaranteed either a voting European Commissioner or a nonvoting Commissioner.
These proposals have been strongly criticized by the Commission itself.146 In its opinion on the Draft Treaty, it points out
that it rarely proceeds to a vote. 1 4 7 It observes that, if non-voting
Commissioners are to be assigned a portfolio, it is hard to see
how they could discharge their responsibilities if they are ex141. Revised Text of Part One, supra note 9, at 40(3).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. art 1-25(3).
145. Treaty of Nice, supra note 4, Protocol A, art. 4(2), O.J. C 80/1, at 52 (2001).
146. See also The European Parliament's Resolution of Sept. 24, 2003, supra note
96, at
30 (where regret is expressed that "the system envisaged makes it difficult to
keep a good European Commissioner for a second term").
147. See Commission Opinion, supra note 63, at 17.

2004]

THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

535

cluded from collective decision-making. If they are not to be
14
assigned a portfolio, it is unclear what their role would be. 1
The Commission's preference is for a national from each Member State to be appointed, each Member having the same rights
and obligations. This, it says, is the only way to ensure that all
national sensitivities, cultures and identities are properly taken
into account in its deliberations.1 4 9 That suggestion is likely to
appeal particularly to the smaller Member States, who tend to
see the Commission as an ally and to oppose moves they perceive
as liable to undermine it.
V. THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF NATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
A. National Parliaments
Because it elevates the European Parliament to the position
of co-legislator alongside the Council of Ministers, greater use of
what the Draft Treaty calls the ordinary legislative procedure
would contribute to increasing the democratic legitimacy of the
Union and its institutions, an objective identified at both Nice
and Laeken. In the same vein, the Draft Treaty seeks to involve
the national parliaments more closely in the Union's activities.' 0
A Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European
Union151 strengthens the Amsterdam Protocol on the same subject, notably by requiring the Commission to send all legislative
proposals and consultation documents directly to Member
States' national parliaments. An accompanying Protocol on the
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality
1 52
would introduce an "early warning system" or "yellow card"
mechanism where a national parliament has concerns as to
whether a Commission proposal complies with the principle of
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. at 6.
150. See, e.g., Draft Treaty, supra note 12, arts. 1-17, 1-24(4), 1-41(2), 1-57, 111-160,
111-161, 111-162, 111-174(2), 111-177(2), IV-7, OJ. C 169/1, at 11, 13, 18, 21, 57-58, 60, 61,
92 (2003) (provisions recognizing a role for national parliaments).
151. For further discussion on the background to the Protocol, see The European
Convention, The Final Report of Working Group IV on the Role of National Parliaments, CONV 353/02, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvO0/
00353en2.pdf (Oct. 22, 2002).
152. The metaphor refers to the cards shown by the referee to soccer players who
infringe the rules during a match. A yellow card signifies a caution. Players shown a
red card must leave the field of play for the duration of the match.
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subsidiarity. It provides that a national parliament "may, within
six weeks from the date of transmission of the Commission's legislative proposal, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission, a reasoned
opinion stating why it considers that the proposal in question
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity."15' 3 If the
number of such reasoned opinions exceeded a certain threshold, the Commission would be required to review its proposal.
That mechanism was introduced following a recommendation by Working Group I on the principle of subsidiarity.1 5 4 The
Working Group went on to suggest that a national parliament
which issues a "yellow card" should have the right to issue a "red
card" by referring the matter to the Court of Justice if its concerns over subsidiarity were not met. That is the background to
paragraph 7 of the proposed new Protocol, the first subparagraph of which provides:
The Court ofJustice shall have jurisdiction to hear actions on
grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a
legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down
in Article 111-270 of the Constitution [the action for annulment or judicial review] by Member States, or notified by
them in accordance with their legal order
on behalf of their
155
national Parliament or a chamber of it.
This subparagraph is clearly inadequate to give effect to the "red
card" mechanism envisaged by Working Group I. In fact, it
makes no change to the present position, since there is nothing
to prevent a Member State from bringing an action for the annulment of a Community act at the request of its national parliament on the ground that the principle of subsidiarity has been
violated.1 56 That would remain the case under the corresponding provisions of the Draft Treaty.
153. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. IV-5, O.J. C 169/1, at 92 (2003). See also
The European Convention, Conclusions of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02, at part II, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/
02/cvOO/00286en2.pdf (Sept. 23, 2002).
154. See id.
155. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
7, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/C2003169en.
009501.htm.
156. This has been pointed out by the House of Lords EU Committee. See HL
Report of the Select Committee on the European Union, The Future of Europe: National
Parliamentsand Subsidiarity, at
15-16 (HL Paper No. 70, 2003).
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There is no point in including provisions in the Constitution that have no effect. The subparagraph should therefore be
deleted or amended to give effect to the recommendation of
Working Group 1. 15 7 If national parliaments are permitted to
bring annulment proceedings for infringement of the principle
of subsidiarity, then consideration might also be given to allowing them to bring such proceedings - only this time for infringement of an essential procedural requirement, where the
Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments is infringed in the
process leading to the adoption of a Union act.
B. The Amendment Procedure
The procedure for amending the Constitution set out in Article IV-7 would involve convening a Convention unless the European Council decided by simple majority, and with the consent of the European Parliament, that the extent of the proposed amendments did not justify that step. 158 The amendment
procedure does not distinguish between different Parts of the
Draft Treaty. Therefore, it could not be used to support an argument that some Parts have higher status than others. Nevertheless, it would remain the case that any amendments would
have to be agreed to by all the Member States and ratified by
them in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. As at present, the approval of the European Parliament
and the Commission could not be required, although the European Parliament would acquire the right to trigger the amendment procedure by submitting proposals to the Council of Ministers. At the moment, that right is confined to national governments and the Commission.
The predicted difficulty of securing agreement on constitutional amendments to the proposed Constitution in a Union of
twenty-five or more Member States led to the inclusion in the
157. In that event, Article 111-270 on the action for annulment would also need to
be amended.
158. The European Parliament has suggested that where a Convention is convened, it should have the right to elect its own Praesidium. See also the European Parliament's Resolution of Sept. 24, 2003, supra note 96, at
34. The Praesidium of the
Convention on the Future of Europe, like that Convention's Chairman and two ViceChairmen, was chosen by the European Council. See the LAEKEN DECLARATION, supra
note 5.
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draft of provisions, some already mentioned, allowing the European Council, acting unanimously, to
1) decide that certain decisions that may only be taken by
the Council of Ministers acting unanimously may henceforward be taken by Qualified Majority Voting;' 5 9 and 0
16
2) extend the use of the ordinary legislative procedure.
These provisions will enable national governments to avoid seeking the approval of their parliaments for changes that would otherwise require such approval. A compromise arrangement may
be to require decisions extending the use of QMV or the ordinary legislative procedure to be submitted to the Member States
for ratification under their own constitutional requirements.' 6 1
The Commission has expressed regret that even minor
amendments to the Constitution would require the agreement
of all the Member States in addition to national ratification. 1 6 2 It
therefore proposes that modifications to Part III of the Constitution ("The Policies and Functioning of the Union") should be
made by the European Council acting by a majority of 5/6 of its
members and with the consent of the European Parliament and
the Commission.16 This suggestion is problematic. 164 If pursued at the IGC, it could lead to some provisions of Part III being moved to, or replicated in, other Parts of the Constitution if
Member States wished to preserve a right to block changes. That
could undermine the structure of the Constitution.
VI. AN APPRAISAL
Each of the four major Treaty revisions that have taken
place since the Rome Treaties were signed in 1957 have signifi159. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, at arts. 1-24(4), 1-39(8), 111-201 (3), O.J. C 169/
1, at 13, 17, 67 (2003).
160. See id. art. 1-24(4), O.J. C 169/1, at 13 (2003) (the so-called "passerelle'clause);
see also id. arts. 111-104(3), 111-130(2), 111-170(3), O.J. C 169/1, at 48, 53, 59 (2003).
161. Cf id. art 1-40(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 18 (discussing a common defense.)
162. The Commission's position on this point is shared by the European Parliament. See European Parliament's Resolution of Sept. 24, 2003, supra note 96, at 32.
163. See Commission of the European Communities, A Constitution for the Union,
COM(2003) 548 Final, at 11 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter A Constitution for the Union].
The Commission envisages that the decision of the European Council would be preceded by a Convention (in which the national parliaments would be represented) and
that compliance with the conditions laid down for this type of amendment procedure
would be supervised by the Court of Justice.
164. See Draft Text of Part IV, supra note 9, at 10.
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cantly altered the balance between national governments and
the supranational institutions that affected the Member States'
freedom of action.' 6 5 If endorsed by the Member States, the
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would be no
exception. However, it remains doubtful that Draft Treaty
would shift the balance away from the Member States to the
same extent as its predecessors, particularly the Single European
Act and the TEU. The House of Lords EU Committee, in commenting in May 2003 on draft Articles on the institutions published by the Convention Praesidium, observed: "it is clear that
the balance of power in the European Union is going to shift
from the Commission in favour of the Member States if the pro166
posals here are adopted.
It is true that the Draft Treaty would extend the use of
QMV, but only to a limited extent. Even where it is envisaged
that QMV will apply, a qualified majority seems likely to prove
more difficult to muster than at present. In a number of important areas, the Draft Treaty would continue to require the Council of Ministers to act unanimously.'6 7 This is especially true of
the CFSP. Although the Draft Treaty makes a limited attempt to
extend the use of QMV in this context, what is striking about the
provisions on CFSP is how firmly it would remain the preserve of
the Member States, with only a limited role for the European
Parliament, the Commission, as distinct from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and the Court of Justice.
There was considerable demand in the Convention for a
more enthusiastic embrace of QMV. 168 Advocates of greater provision for QMV view it as promoting consensus and more rapid
agreement rather than necessarily leading to more frequent voting. As Galloway explains, "qualified majority voting lends a dynamic to negotiating in the Council in which [M] ember [S] tates
165. This is reflected in the Court's Opinion on the European Economic Area,
where it spoke of the Member States having limited their sovereign rights "in ever wider
fields." See DECLARATION ON THE FUTURE OF THE UNION, supra note 1, at 1 3.
166. HL Report of the Select Committee on the European Union, The Future of
Europe: ConstitutionalTreaty - Draft articles on the institutions, at 1 11 (HL Paper No. 105,
2003).
167. This disappointed the Commission, which has suggested ways of reducing still
further the requirement of unanimity. See A Constitution for the Union, supra note
163, at
6-9.
168. Cf European Parliament's Resolution of Sept. 24, 2003, supra note 96, at I
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are forced to seek compromises, to consider what their key bottom-line objectives are and to focus their negotiating effort accordingly." '6 9 Opponents of greater recourse to QMV sometimes forget that no Member State opposes everything. Enlargement increases the likelihood that, where unanimity is required,
measures supported by a majority of Member States will be
blocked by perhaps a single dissident. In relation to the CFSP,
however, greater use of QMV could well prove counter-productive. As some members of Working Group VII on external action pointed out, QMV would "heighten third country awareness
of internal EU disagreement, thus rendering CFSP less effec1 70
tive."
Some will also find disappointing the failure of the Draft
Treaty to address principles of a constitutional nature which
have been laid down by the Court of justice in its case law. It is
true that there is a provision (albeit unsatisfactory) on primacy,
but there is no mention of the related concepts of direct effect
or State liability in damages. 171 Moreover, no attempt has been
made to reflect in Article 111-274, which concerns the preliminary rulings procedure, the limits on the power of national
courts to pronounce on the validity of Union acts laid down in
the Foto-Frost case. 172 These omissions seem hard to defend in a
document which describes itself as a Constitution and is intended to add clarity.
Others may be reassured by the prospective demise of the
(in) famous reference to "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe," which appears in the preambles to both the EC
Treaty and the TEU, as well as in Article 1 of the latter. It is
replaced in the preamble to the Draft Treaty by a less provocative reference to the peoples of Europe as "united ever more
closely." 173 The Draft Treaty makes it clear that the powers en169. See GALLOWAY, supra note 69, at 62; see also HL Report of the Select Committee on the European Union, The Future of the European Union: The Future of Europe Convention Working Group Reports on Defense and External Action (HL Paper No. 80, 2003).
170. See The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 459/02, at
45, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/
en/02/cv00/00459en2.pdf (Dec. 16, 2002).
171. See, e.g., Francovich and Others, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] ECR I5357.
172. See Foto-Frost, Case 314/85 [1987] ECR 4199.
173. The Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which appears at the
beginning of Part II of the Draft Treaty, retains its existing reference to "an ever closer
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joyed by the Union are conferred on it by the Member States,
who therefore remain its collective masters.17 4 It states explicitly
that: "Powers not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution
remain with the Member States."1'75 This was seen by Working
Group V as an aspect of the principle of conferral and as necessary to establish a presumption in favor of national competence. 17 6 The expanded provision on the Union's obligation to
respect the national identities of the Member States1 7 7 further
underlines the role and importance of the Member States in the
proposed constitutional dispensation.178
CONCLUSION
The Draft Treaty has attracted a variety of epithets, some
bearing a more distant relationship with the truth than others.
A middle-market British newspaper famously described it as a
"blueprint for tyranny. 1 79 At the other end of the spectrum, the
British Government representative on the Convention, the Rt.
Hon. Peter Hain MP, said the draft was no more than a "tidying
up exercise."18 Valkry Giscard d'Estaing himself stated, in his
so-called Rome Declaration made as the full draft Treaty was
handed over to the President of the European Council,' 1 that
the Draft Treaty struck "the necessary balance between peoples,
union" among the peoples of Europe. That seems to be an oversight given that there is
no corresponding reference in the Preamble to the Draft Treaty itself.
174. The term "Herren der Vertrdge" ["masters of the Treaties"] was used by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht in its Maastricht decision, Brunner v. European Union Treaty
[1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57.
175. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, art. 1-9(2), O.J. C 169/1, at 10 (2003).
176. See The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group V, CONV
375/1/02 REV 1, at
10, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/
cv0/00375-rlen2.pdf (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Working Group V Report].
177. See Draft Treaty, supra note 12, at art. 1-5(1), OJ. C 169/1, at 9 (2003). Cf
Consolidated TEU, supra note 4, art. 6(3), O.J. C 325/5, at 12 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 69
(ex Article F).
178. See Working Group V Report, supra note 176, at
10-12.
179. See A Blueprint for Tyranny, DAILY MAIL, May 8, 2003, available at http://www.
no-euro.com/mediacentre/dossiers/display.asp?IDNO=1236. See also Report from the
Presidency, supra note 13, at ann. III. That annex contains a minority report produced
by a group of dissident members of the Convention who, although not seeking to block
consensus, were unable to endorse the Draft Treaty.
180. See, e.g., Patrick Wintour, Hain Plays Down Any Poll on EU Future: Restructuring
Mainly a Matter of Tidying Up,Says Chief Negotiator, THE GUARDIAN, May 14, 2003, at 13.
181. See Rome Declaration, July 18, 2003, available at http://european-convention.
eu.int/docs/Treaty/RomeEN.pdf.
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between States new and old, between institutions and between
dream and reality."'1 2 He went on to make a plea for the text to
be left unchanged at the IGC:
"Reopening it, even in part,
18 3
would cause it to unravel."
It is natural for the authors of such a long and complex document to be anxious at the prospect of entrusting its fate to
others, but it was never the intention that the outcome of the

Convention's work should simply be rubber-stamped by the
Member States. Although the view that the draft should not be
altered initially attracted powerful support, l" 4 it is by no means

universally held. In its White Paper, the British Government
stated:
Like most other Member States, the UK does not support
every proposal put forward in the Convention. Important issues still need to be determined, as European leaders made
clear at Thessaloniki. Some of these are areas of unfinished
business, where the Convention has not worked through the
detail of its proposals. Some are ideas with which we disagree. And some are issues which
require further technical,
18 5
including important legal, work.

In a press release issued in June 2003,186 the Commission criticized the draft for an alleged lack of ambition and said it would
do what it could to secure improvements at the IGC. Its opinion
of September 17, 200387 was more measured, urging the IGC
not to upset the overall balance of the draft but nonetheless indi182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany & President Jacques
Chirac of France, Remarks at the Conclusion of the Franco-German Summit in Dresden, Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.elysee.fr/magazine/deplacement-etranger/
sommaire.php?doc=/Documents/discours/2003/CP030904.html.
185. See British White Paper, supra note 20, at 43. At their meeting in Berlin on
September 20, 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Chirac, and Chancellor
Schroeder seemed to agree that some issues might need to be reopened, but that anyone wishing to do so would be responsible for finding a new consensus. For further
analysis see the transcript of the press conference following the meeting on the 10
Downing Street web site, available at http://www.number-I0.gov.uk/output/Page
4508.asp.
186. See Commission Press Release, IP/03/836, available at http://europa.eu.int/
rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=GT&doc=IP/03/836---0-AGED&lg=EN
&display= (June 13, 2003).
187. See Commission Opinion, supra note 63. A similarly nuanced line was taken
by the European Parliament in its resolution of September 24, 2003. See European
Parliament's Resolution of Sept. 24, 2003, supra note 96.
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cating several areas where the Commission considered it incomplete or inadequate.
The adoption of a Constitution will represent a milestone in
the history of the EU. Once agreed, it is likely to be hard to
change. The text, which emerges from the IGC must not only
be conceptually coherent, it must also be one which national
governments can sell to perhaps skeptical national parliaments
and electorates. That is unlikely to be possible if serious national
concerns are left unaddressed.

